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Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust 
Policy 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP†
ERIK HOVENKAMP
 
††
INTRODUCTION 
 
A bundled discount occurs when a seller conditions a 
discount or rebate on the buyer’s purchase of two or more 
different products from that seller.1
  
† Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 Bundled discounts come 
in many varieties. For example, the seller might offer a 10% 
discount to a buyer who takes product A from the buyer, 
provided that the buyer purchases product B as well. The 
seller might offer the discount on each purchase of one unit 
of A, provided that it is accompanied by one unit of B. 
Alternatively, it might condition the discount or rebate on 
purchases of both A and B, but without specifying the 
proportion, leaving the customer to determine its needs for 
the two products. It might do this by stipulating a “market 
share” percentage rather than a requirement of all 
purchases. For example, it might provide for a 10% discount 
to buyers who agree to take at least 70% of their needs of 
both A and B from the seller, but without specifying the 
percentage of each. Or it might do the same thing but with 
three, four or even a dozen products rather than two. The 
terms can vary widely, but the most obvious variables are 
(1) the number of goods in the bundle; (2) the proportion of 
the goods in the bundle, and whether the proportion is 
specified in an any sense or left completely up to the 
customer; and (3) the percentage share of its needs that the 
customer must purchase from the seller in order to obtain 
the discount.  
†† Undergraduate, Economics and Mathematics, University of Iowa. 
 1. Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled 
Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 
517, 517 (2008); see also 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 749 (3d ed. 2008). 
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Here we consider “complex bundles,” or bundles that 
include more than two goods, or more than one unit of at 
least one bundled good, or that permit the customer to 
determine the proportion of the various goods in the bundle 
that it purchases. Such complex bundling is a common 
practice and can be found, for example, in markets for 
medical supplies or devices brokered by Group Purchasing 
Organizations (GPOs) and sold from the device 
manufacturers to health care providers such as hospitals.2 
Indeed, the bundle that is most generally the subject of 
study—one monopoly good and one competitive good—is a 
relative rarity. The bundle at issue in the Ninth Circuit’s 
important Cascade decision was also complex in this way. 
There, the defendant gave a discount conditioned on the 
buyers’ agreement to take a bundle of three products, 
primary, secondary and tertiary medical care, from the 
seller.3
Bundled discounting is an exceedingly common practice 
in commercial contracts involving suppliers of multiple 
interrelated products. Unquestionably, a great majority of 
such discounting practices are competitively harmless and 
should be lawful. However, bundled discounts have one 
characteristic that has brought them under antitrust 
scrutiny: the discount must be “amortized” over the range of 
products that the seller offers. If a rival producer sells some 
subset but less than all the goods in the dominant firm’s 
bundled discount offering, it will have a smaller range of 
goods over which to amortize the discount.
 The proportion of services in each component of the 
bundle was not known when the arrangement was created, 
but was determined later by post-agreement patient 
demand. 
4
  
 2. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HEALTH INDUS. GROUP PURCHASING ASS’N, 
GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATION (GPO) PURCHASING AGREEMENTS AND 
ANTITRUST LAW (2004), http://www.higpa.org/pdf/2004HovenkampGPOsandAnt 
itrustLaw.pdf. 
 As a result, the 
 3. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 892 (9th Cir. 
2008); see also LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); 
Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 359 F. Supp. 2d 307, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 
n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001); Ortho 
Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467-70 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
 4. See infra apps. 1-2. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344536
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proportionate discount it needs to give on each product in 
the bundle in order to capture the sale must be larger. 
To illustrate, suppose that a dominant firm produces 
goods A and B at a cost of $5 and $7, respectively. It sells 
the two goods separately for $10 each per unit but offers a 
20% discount to anyone who will take a bundle of one A 
good and one B good. Note that this discounted price, $16, is 
well above the firm’s costs, which are $12. However, a rival 
sells only B, for which its production costs are also $7. If a 
customer wants the rival’s B good it loses the discount from 
the dominant firm on the A good. As a result, the customer 
must pay $10 for the dominant firm’s A, and at least $7, the 
cost price, for the rival firm’s B. The rival will be unable to 
capture the sale of B even though it is equally efficient, in 
the sense that its production costs for B are the same as 
those faced by the dominant firm. 
The important things about this illustration are, first, 
that at all times the dominant firm is selling its goods above 
cost. Even the fully discounted $16 price for the A-B bundle 
is well above the firm’s $12 costs for producing the two 
goods. Second, the rival is “equally efficient” in the sense 
that it has the same costs for producing B that the 
dominant firm has; it simply does not make good A. Third, 
the practice is nevertheless “exclusionary” in the sense that 
the rival cannot profitably compete with it, at least to those 
customers who wish to purchase As and Bs together and in 
equal amounts. 
The practice thus has some, but not all, of the 
characteristics of predatory pricing, which is condemned 
only when the dominant firm’s overall price structure is 
below a relevant measure of cost.5 The practice is similar in 
the sense that it is a pricing practice that is capable of 
excluding an equally efficient rival, which is also a defining 
characteristic of orthodox single-product predatory pricing 
as the Supreme Court defined that practice in the Brooke 
Group case.6  
 5. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 
(2007) (developing requirements of Sherman Act predatory pricing law under § 
2, in case involving buyer alleged predation); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (developing requirements of 
Sherman Act predatory pricing law under Robinson-Patman Act); see also 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 720-21. 
 Second, the practice is fully “sustainable” in 
 6. On the equally efficient rival test for monopolistic pricing practices 
generally, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶ 651b2. On the test as 
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the sense that the dominant firm’s prices are always above 
its costs. Indeed, in our example the fully discounted price is 
25% above the dominant firm’s costs, a situation that one 
would not find even presumptively suspicious. 
Third, because the price is profitable it likely has a 
perfectly good explanation that has nothing to do with the 
suppression of competition: the price might be profitable 
because the dominant firm sells more units of output at the 
20% bundled discount than it does when it charges the 
higher separate prices for the two products. That is to say, 
the practice can be fully profitable for the dominant firm 
without regard to its impact on competition. And indeed, 
that has to be the case because bundled discount pricing is 
commonly used even in highly competitive markets where 
exclusion of rivals is not generally possible. For example, a 
high school basketball team might sell a season ticket with 
ten games at a lower price than the sum of ten individual 
game tickets. Or a restaurant in Manhattan might offer a 
prix fixe dinner that includes five courses at a lower price 
than the individual menu price of the five items. 
Destruction of rivals cannot be the explanation for these 
pricing practices in these markets. 
In these two examples exclusion of an equally efficient 
rival is probably not a possibility because it is so easy for a 
rival high school basketball team to combine its events into 
a single season ticket, and just as easy for a rival restaurant 
to combine its courses and offer a lower bundled price. To 
the extent that a competitive problem arises, it must be 
because the rival firm is unable, at least in the short term, 
to match the dominant firm’s combination. What the 
antitrust cases involving bundled discounts7 have in 
common is that the rival makes only a subset of the goods in 
the bundle and cannot readily add in the extra goods that 
would enable it to produce the full range. Nor can it readily 
form joint ventures with others, which would have the same 
effect.8
  
used in bundled discount cases see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 
520-34, and Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer 
Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423, 447-62 (2006). 
 
 7. See decisions cited supra note 3.  
 8. On this point, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 525-28. See 
also Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688 
(2005). 
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Much of the recent case law and commentary on 
bundled discounts has dealt with the formulation of cost-
based tests for determining when a bundled discount is 
“exclusionary” in the sense that it keeps rivals out of the 
market. In order to have antitrust significance a bundle 
must not merely keep one rival out of the market; it must 
exclude all of them. That is to say, a firm’s aggregate 
discount of product A, B, and C might very well exclude a 
rival who produces only B and C, but not A. However, if 
there are other rivals in the market who also make the full 
range of A, B, and C, then the practice is not exclusionary, 
although it may limit the range of effective competition to 
those firms capable of competing across the full range of 
goods. 
The term “bundle-to-bundle” discount competition refers 
to competition among two or more firms that offer the full 
range of goods in the bundle.9 In general, if bundle-to-
bundle discount competition can occur in a market, then a 
particular firm’s bundled discount cannot be exclusionary 
unless its overall price is below its costs. Otherwise an 
equally efficient firm exists that would be able to match the 
discounted price and earn a profit.10 Further, the other rival 
need not offer the defendant’s full product line. If two or 
more competitors collectively produce the entire contents of 
the bundle, they will be able to match the dominant firm’s 
pricing.11
When the fully discounted price of a dominant firm’s 
bundle is above cost, the most obvious explanation for the 
 However, this result may not hold if the bundling 
firm observes significant cost savings as a result of 
producing the bundle’s entire contents simultaneously (e.g., 
joint cost savings, scope economies). In that case, rivals who 
produce only a subset of the bundle may not be able to 
attain those savings. As a result, the dominant firm’s price, 
while above its own costs, may be too low for any coalition of 
rivals to compete with it. 
  
 9. See, e.g., Barry Nalebuff, Competing Against Bundles, in INCENTIVES, 
ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 327-28 (Peter J. Hammond & Gareth D. 
Myles eds., 2000). 
 10. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶ 749b; Hovenkamp & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 524-25; see also Timothy J. Muris & Vernon L. 
Smith, Antitrust and Bundled Discounts: An Experimental Analysis, 75 
ANTITRUST L.J. 399, 428 (2008). 
 11. See infra text accompanying note 28. 
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bundle is that it results in more sales—such as the prix fixe 
menu in a highly competitive restaurant market. Further, 
this is likely to be the case even if rivals do not produce all 
bundled goods and cannot match the discount. As a result, a 
bundled discount practice might be “exclusionary” in the 
sense that rivals cannot match the bundled price, but the 
practice still does not warrant condemnation because it is 
fully justified by the dominant firm’s attempts to increase 
its own output. We reserve the term “predatory” for bundled 
discount practices that are profitable only because they are 
able to exclude equally efficient rivals and create or sustain 
a monopoly. In sum, a bundle is exclusionary if it would 
force an equally efficient rival to price below cost in order to 
compete with it.12
Every predatory bundle is exclusionary, while 
presumably very few exclusionary bundles are predatory. 
This suggests that a test for whether a bundle is 
exclusionary can offer safe harbor, but only that. If a 
dominant firm’s bundled discount passes this test then no 
further investigation into its discount practice is warranted; 
the practice does not exclude in the antitrust sense. 
However, if the dominant firm’s bundled price flunks this 
test, then the bundle is “exclusionary” and further 
investigation is warranted in order to determine whether it 
is also predatory. The bundling strategy’s short run 
profitability must be compared to its potential for harming 
rivals, which can help determine whether it is 
“unreasonably exclusionary,” or designed with only that 
purpose in mind.  
 A bundle is predatory if it is profitable 
only if one or more rivals are excluded. 
I. THE ATTRIBUTION TEST AS A SAFE HARBOR 
In 2007 the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
(AMC), a government created commission created to study 
the antitrust laws and recommend improvements,13
  
 12. For our purposes, we will assume that to “compete with the bundle,” an 
equally efficient rival must set a price such that consumers are indifferent 
between buying the bundle and buying individually the goods that comprise it.  
 
proposed the following test for unilaterally imposed 
bundling when challenged as an exclusionary practice: 
 13. See Symposium, The Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 475 (2008). 
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Courts should adopt a . . . test to determine whether bundled 
discounts or rebates violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To 
prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be required to 
show each one of the following elements (as well as other elements 
of a Section 2 claim): (1)  after allocating all discounts and rebates 
attributable to the entire bundle of products to the competitive 
product, the defendant sold the competitive product below its 
incremental cost for the competitive product; . . . .14
The Ninth Circuit, in the Cascade decision, 
subsequently adopted a variation of this test, under which 
one attributes the entire discount to the product upon which 
exclusion is claimed (sometimes called the “competitive” 
product). Then, if the resulting price of the competitive 
product is lower than the defendant’s average variable 
cost,
 
15
Significantly, the cost portion of the AMC test is not a 
test for anticompetitive effects as such: it simply asks the 
question whether the bundle is structurally capable of 
excluding some hypothetical rival who produces only a 
subset of the goods in the bundle. How little the test shows 
needs to be clear, because some regard it as a mantra for 
anticompetitive pricing.
 the test is failed, and the discount is deemed to be 
“exclusionary” and may be unlawful in some cases.  
16
  
 14. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 
(2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_re 
port.pdf [hereinafter AMC REPORT]. The test went on to include two additional 
elements: “(2) the defendant is likely to recoup these short-term losses; and (3) 
the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an adverse 
effect on competition.” Id. 
 For example, suppose that 
Manhattan has 1,000 restaurants that offer discounted prix 
fixe menus that include wine, but that one of these 1,000 
restaurants has lost its liquor license and as a result cannot 
 15. On the use of average variable cost as the number see Hovenkamp & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 520-21. The Cascade decision explicitly adopted an 
average variable cost test: 
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the 
purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after 
allocating the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of 
products to the competitive product or products, the defendant sold the 
competitive product or products below its average variable cost of 
producing them. 
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 910 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 16. See generally Cascade, 515 F.3d at 900-02. 
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include wine in the bundle. The bundled prices of the 
remaining 999 restaurants might all flunk the attribution 
test because the one restaurant without wine cannot match 
the foregone wine discount in its own prix fixe menu 
without running its prices below its costs. But the 
restaurant market in Manhattan remains robustly 
competitive. 
Once a firm’s bundle flunks the attribution test, a full 
analysis of market structure, competitive effects, and 
rationales for the profitability of the defendant’s bundle 
remain to be examined. Applied alone, the attribution test is 
significantly over-deterrent, particularly when the firm 
observes cost savings in production or distribution. For 
example, a firm with joint costs distributed over A and B 
will always be able to offer an A-B combination at a lower 
price than could two different firms that each produce only 
one of those goods, but match the bundling firm’s efficiency 
in producing them individually.17
In sum, the attribution test simply asks whether a 
bundle is exclusionary. Any bundle that is not exclusionary 
cannot be predatory. But the important question is not 
whether a bundle can exclude, but whether it is predatory. 
If the defendant can show that a bundling strategy does not 
reduce short run profits, then immediate gains from 
increased sales is the dominant explanation, and one cannot 
show that the strategy is profitable only because it destroys 
a rival. Suppose a monopolist in the market for good A 
decides to sell a discounted bundle of goods A and B, where 
B is sold in a moderately competitive market. As in the 
previous illustration, assume that A and B are sold 
individually for $10 each, while costs are $5 for A and $7 for 
B. A rival firm produces only B. The monopolist then offers 
a 20% discount on the bundle, yielding a bundled price of 
$16. If there are no joint costs, the attribution test is 
effective. It subtracts the nominal value of the discount ($4) 
from the price of B. The result, which is $6, defines the 
maximum price the rival can charge for a unit of B in order 
 Because joint costs can be 
any relevant cost distributed over multiple goods, including 
costs such as distribution, transportation, and order 
processing, such cost-savings very likely explain the vast 
majority of bundled discounting practices, including those 
that flunk the attribution test. 
  
 17. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 525-28; infra app. 2. 
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to compete with the bundle (i.e., the price of B that reduces 
the value of the bundle’s discount to zero). The example fails 
the attribution test. Further, the given information does not 
guarantee that total profits will not fall in the short run 
before any exclusion occurs. As such, the bundle does not 
presently warrant safe harbor, and so other evidence must 
be considered before we can determine if the bundle is also 
predatory.18
However, if this example is modified to include joint 
costs, the attribution test becomes overreaching and 
ineffective. Suppose that there is a joint cost savings of $3 
that results from the simultaneous production of A and B. 
Hence, the cost of producing individual units is $5 for A and 
$7 for B, as before, while the cost of producing both goods 
simultaneously is $9. The monopolist again gives a 20% 
discount, so that the price of the bundle is $16. To apply the 
attribution test, the nominal value of the discount ($4) is 
subtracted from the price of B (or, equivalently, the price of 
A is subtracted from the bundle price), which leaves us with 
$6. This amount is less than the cost of producing an 
individual unit of B, so the attribution test is failed. 
However, the incremental cost of producing the bundle (i.e., 
the cost of the bundle less the cost of A) is $4. Conversely, 
the incremental price of selling B with A (i.e., the price of 
the bundle less the price of A) is $6. Thus, the incremental 
price of the bundle exceeds its incremental cost, so the 
bundle yields a greater per-unit profit than an individual 
unit of A.
 
19
This is strikingly different from the practice of 
predatory bundling, which forfeits short-term profits in 
order to exclude a rival, and which inevitably harms 
consumers in a later period of recoupment. Rather, what the 
bundling firm has effectively done is pass its efficiency gains 
on to consumers, while still increasing short term profits. 
 Any consumers who switch from buying A to 
buying the bundle will contribute more profits to the 
bundling firm as a result. 
  
 18. For example, if output increased significantly in response to the discount, 
the dominant firm might sell many more units at the bundled discount price, 
earning $4 more in profits on each bundle than it earns by selling the units 
separately and earning $8 in profits on each sale of an A + B pair. On the other 
hand, if output did not increase that significantly, then there must be some 
other explanation for the bundled discount’s profitability. 
 19. In the preceding case of no joint costs, the profits earned by selling the 
bundle were strictly less than those earned by selling A individually. 
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Moreover, these efficiency gains leave the bundle with a 
significantly larger profit margin, so that it could easily 
afford to slash prices further if its goal were to exclude a 
rival. Indeed, the bundling firm in our example could price 
the bundle at $9.50, which would be above cost, yet could 
not be matched by a rival at any price—let alone a 
sustainable one. So, while this bundle is indeed 
exclusionary, it is clearly not the sort of bundled discount 
that merits antitrust intervention. As this example shows, 
there can be many applications of discounted bundling that 
are pro-competitive and welfare-increasing, despite having 
an adverse impact on a rival. 
With some minor adjustments, the attribution test can 
be modified so that it yields the correct outcomes, even in 
the presence of joint costs.20 The improved test, called the 
“Incremental Cost Test” (ICT), works by offering safe harbor 
to any bundle whose incremental price (over the primary 
good) is at least as great as its incremental cost. The ICT is 
based on the assumption that total profits will not fall if the 
bundled sales are at least as profitable as individual sales of 
the primary good.21
One implication of the improvements gained through 
the ICT is that the concept of an “equally efficient rival” has 
limited significance when rivals do not produce every good 
in the bundle. The condition of “equal efficiency” normally 
takes a firm as it is found and looks at all relevant costs. 
For example, suppose that individual production costs of A 
and B are $5 and $7, respectively, but that producing them 
together costs only $9. To call a firm an equally efficient 
rival simply because it produces B alone at a cost of $7 is 
inaccurate—the firm would reduce its costs by adding in 
 Such would imply the bundling strategy 
is profitable regardless of its impact on rivals, indicating 
that the bundle is not predatory. As an example of this 
improved test, suppose that a dominant firm prices A and B 
separately at $10 each, but prices them together in a bundle 
for $16. In that case, the ICT queries whether the $6 
increase in price when good B is added into the bundle is 
sufficient to cover B’s incremental cost. If the answer is yes, 
then the bundle passes the ICT and offers a safe harbor. 
Unlike the AMC’s attribution test, this test takes joint costs 
into account.  
  
 20. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 525-28. 
 21. For an explanation of this assumption, see infra app. 3. 
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product A and attaining the joint cost savings as well. In 
principle, that is no different from observing that, in the 
presence of scale economies, a firm making 100 units per 
month might reduce its per-unit costs by increasing output 
to 200 units. In that case, the 100 unit firm is less efficient 
than the 200 unit firm. In one situation, the firm reduces its 
costs by making more of the same product; in the other, it 
reduces its costs by adding in an additional product subject 
to joint production costs. Indeed, if the monopolist sells only 
the bundle and individual units of good A, and if joint cost 
savings are observed, then the monopolist has no units of 
output with production technologies comparable to those of 
rival producers of B. That is, there is no production process 
at which the monopolist and a B-market rival could be 
equally efficient. Rather, the joint cost savings make the 
technology used for producing individual units of B 
fundamentally different from that used for creating the 
bundle, and the idea of “equal efficiency” loses most of its 
meaning.  
A bundle is predatory (not merely exclusionary) only if 
its ability to maintain or increase total profits requires the 
exclusion of one or more rivals. Hence, a pass of the ICT 
guarantees that the bundle is not predatory, though it may 
be exclusionary in the presence of joint costs. This is 
because the ICT simply asks whether the per-unit profits 
achieved by the bundle are as great as those achieved by 
individual sales of A. If the bundled discount simply passes 
on a discount that is no greater than the joint cost savings, 
then per unit profitability on the bundle will be at least as 
high as profits earned on the primary component of the 
bundle. Such a bundle cannot be predatory, for it is 
profitable even when no rivals are excluded. This result 
illustrates the real difference between the attribution test 
and the incremental cost test. Namely, the attribution test 
asks whether a bundle is exclusionary, while the ICT goes 
further to ask whether it is potentially predatory. Of course, 
many bundles that are potentially predatory (i.e., many that 
fail the ICT) are pro-competitive, but these tests are only 
designed to provide safe harbor; they cannot be used to 
identify an unlawful bundle outright. 
II. COMPLEX BUNDLES 
The competitive effects of bundled discounts are more 
difficult to assess when we consider bundles that are more 
complex than simply 1 unit of product A and 1 unit of 
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product B. In general, taking prices as given, a bundle is 
defined by (i) a set of bundled goods; (ii) a set of bundled 
quantities or proportions; and (iii) a discount factor. 
Complex bundling occurs when the set of bundled goods is 
greater than 2, when the bundled quantities of one or more 
goods exceed 1, or when the proportions of the goods can be 
varied. A bundle may not contain 2 products, only 3 or 
more, and the additional products may or may not be 
produced by the rival(s), or one secondary product might be 
produced by one rival while another is produced by a 
different rival. Fortunately, the principles that apply to 
bundled pairs of goods also apply to complex bundles. 
However, if the number of goods within a bundle changes or 
the quantities of each good are changed, then the bundle’s 
impact on rivals may change as well. Indeed, as this section 
will illustrate, the competitive effects of similar-appearing 
bundles can, in fact, be strikingly different. 
The analysis that follows focuses on two situations: 
first, bundles that contain more than 2 products and second, 
bundles that contain multiple units of 1 or more bundled 
goods where the customer is entitled to vary the proportions 
of the goods in the bundle. 
A. Bundles with More than Two Products 
Bundling introduces a new element of competition into 
the markets of each bundled good. We consider firms in 
these markets to be rivals, despite the fact that they may 
produce only a subset of those goods within the bundle. This 
sort of pricing affects different rivals in different ways, 
depending on which bundled goods they can produce, as 
well as the combinations of goods that customers purchase. 
We can use much of the same reasoning to analyze large 
bundles as is applied in the simple case of bundled pairs. 
Significantly, a bundle encompassing many different goods 
and quantities can still be considered as a union of two 
parts with opposing competitive effects, just as A and B in a 
bundled pair. However, when bundles include more than 
two different goods, these opposing parts are perceived 
differently by different rivals, depending on which parts 
they offer. For example, suppose a dominant firm offers a 
bundle of the three goods, A, B, and C, where A is produced 
exclusively by the bundling firm. Assume that rival 1 
produces only B, while rival 2 produces only C. Rival 1 
perceives good C no differently from good A, though good C 
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is in fact sold by both the dominant firm and rival 2. By 
contrast, rival 2 does not perceive good C in this way, but 
rather perceives good B as a second monopoly good. As a 
result, discussion of a given bundle must be relativized to a 
particular rival before we can understand how that rival 
stands to be affected. 
Building on the previous example,22 suppose that a 
bundle contains exactly one unit of both A and B, but also 
includes 1 unit of a third good, Y. Assume that Y is 
produced by both the monopolist and its B-market rivals. 
The standalone price of Y is $10, while its production cost is 
$6. Products A and B are sold separately for $10 each, and 
production costs are $5 for A and $7 for B. The monopolist 
sells individual units of A and also the A-B-Y bundle, which 
it discounts by 20% for a bundled price of $24. If we apply 
the ICT, we see that the bundle’s incremental cost over good 
A is $13, while its incremental price is $14. Hence, the ICT 
is passed and the bundle is granted safe harbor. This stands 
in contrast to the A-B bundle presented in the last section, 
which failed the ICT. To generalize, the addition of goods to 
the bundle that both the dominant firm and the rival 
produce makes exclusion less likely, provided the discount 
factor is unchanged.23
Alternatively, suppose we add a third good X to the A-B 
bundle, but assume that the rival does not produce X. Good 
X has a price of $10 and a cost of $6; that is, it is identical to 
good Y in price and cost. As before, A and B are sold for $10 
each, and have costs of $5 and $7 respectively. As with the 
A-B-Y bundle, the 20% discount applied to the A-B-X bundle 
results in a bundled price of $24. However, unlike the 
preceding case, the ICT now measures incremental prices 
and costs with respect to both A and X, as these constitute 
the primary component of the bundle in this case (i.e., the 
component not produced by the rival). The bundle’s 
incremental price is $4, while its incremental cost is $7, so 
that the A-B-X bundle fails the ICT. Hence, the addition of 
good X to the A-B bundle has the reverse effect obtained by 
the addition of good Y. In general, the addition of goods not 
 
  
 22. See supra Part II.A. 
 23. See infra apps. 2-3. 
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produced by a rival makes exclusion of that rival more 
likely, provided the discount factor is unchanged.24
The two examples simply illustrate the proposition that 
in order for the rival to compete with an “incomplete” 
bundle it must apply a series of price cuts to the bundled 
goods it can produce. As the number of bundled goods not 
produced by the rival increases, the rival is forced to employ 
larger price cuts on the ones that it does produce in order to 
compete. Put differently, excluding a rival is easier when a 
bundle includes more goods that the rival cannot produce. 
By contrast, the addition of goods that are produced by both 
the bundling firm and the rival makes exclusion less likely, 
as the rival can compete with the bundle using relatively 
smaller price cuts.
  
25
The addition of the third good (X or Y) into the bundle 
has a differential impact on rivals depending on whether 
they also sell the third good. If they do, exclusion becomes 
relatively more difficult. If they do not, exclusion becomes 
relatively easier. As a result, the addition of another good to 
a bundle may benefit one rival, who makes the third good, 
but it may burden or even exclude a different rival who does 
not make the third good. One important corollary of this 
observation is that the rival can compete more easily by 
adding additional goods to the bundle, whether or not they 
are the dominant firm’s monopolized goods. 
 
Thus, for example, suppose a bundle offered by the 
dominant firm aggregates discounts across 5 products, A, B, 
C, D, and E. Ceteris paribus, the more of these products that 
the rival produces, the more easily it will be able to match 
the discount. This also means that if many rivals compete 
with the dominant firm, their individual ability to compete 
will depend greatly on how many and which of the goods in 
the bundle they produce. A firm that produces goods B, C, 
D, and E will be able to compete more readily than a rival 
that produces only C, D, and E. When proportions of the 
  
 24. It should be noted that a bundled good need not be a “monopoly good” in 
order to make competing with the bundle more difficult for rivals in a secondary 
market. Rather, any bundled good that is not produced by those rivals makes 
competing with the bundle more difficult, regardless of whether or not that 
good’s production is unique to the bundling firm. For a more detailed 
explanation, see infra apps. 1-3. 
 25. For an explanation and proof of how various aspects of a bundle 
contribute to its potential for exclusion, see infra apps. 1-3. 
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goods in the bundle can be varied at the request of the 
customer, the analysis becomes even more complex.26
To simplify discussion, we offer some terminology to 
help identify the significant components of a bundle. These 
must be relativized to a particular rival because, as the last 
paragraph illustrates, different rivals may be impacted in 
different ways. For a given rival, we say that a bundled 
good is a competing good if the rival has the ability to 
produce that good. Conversely, we say that a bundled good 
is an excluding good for a particular rival if that rival does 
not (and perhaps cannot) produce that good. Accordingly, we 
define a rival’s competing share of a bundle to be the set of 
all bundled units of that rival’s competing goods. Likewise, 
a rival’s excluding share of a bundle is the set of all bundled 
units of that rival’s excluding goods.
 
27
We can think of these shares as undiscounted baskets of 
goods, the quantities of which are the same as they are 
within the discounted bundle. A rival’s competing share, for 
instance, includes all of the rival’s competing goods, and at 
the same quantities in which they appear within the 
discounted bundle. For example, suppose a bundle includes 
3 units of A, 2 units of B, and 1 unit of Y. Assume that a 
rival produces only B and Y. Then B and Y are competing 
goods for the rival, while A is the only excluding good. 
Likewise, the rival’s competing share consists of 2 units of B 
and 1 unit of Y, while its excluding share consists of 3 units 
of A. Hence, we see that for any rival, the union of both 
shares observed by that rival is equivalent to the entire 
contents of the bundle. 
 Importantly, these 
shares must be computed for each particular rival—we 
cannot merely look at the shares produced by the dominant 
firm, or defendant, as is typically done in antitrust analysis. 
With these definitions, it is easier to describe the steps 
that a rival must take in order to compete with a bundle. 
Our preceding examples28
  
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
 that considered bundles of three 
goods demonstrate how a rival’s competing and excluding 
shares of the bundle work against one another. In 
particular, a rival must amortize over its own output the 
nominal value of the dominant firm’s discount in order to 
 27. See infra apps. 1-2. 
 28. See supra Part II.A. 
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compete with it. To do this, the rival must attribute a series 
of price cuts to its competing goods so that the undiscounted 
value of its competing share falls by an amount no less than 
the bundle’s nominal discount. Intuitively, this just says 
that the rival must eliminate the discount provided by the 
bundle, which it accomplishes by reducing the prices of one 
or more competing goods.  
To see how a bundle’s impact may vary among rivals, 
consider another example. Suppose a firm produces a 
bundle that consists of 1 unit of each of the goods A1, A2, 
and A3, in addition to 2 units of B1 and 1 unit of B2. Hence 
the bundle includes 6 units of 5 different goods. Rival 1 sells 
only B1, rival 2 sells only B2, and the bundling firm sells 
only the bundle and individual units of the 3 A-goods. For 
simplicity, assume that each of the 5 goods in the bundle is 
priced at $10 and costs $6 to produce. The bundling firm 
offers a 10% discount on the full bundle, so the price of the 
bundle is $54. With this, we will first consider the bundle 
from the perspective of rival 1. According to the definitions 
given above, 2 units of B1 comprise the competing share of 
this bundle for rival 1, while its excluding share includes 1 
unit of each of the goods A1, A2, A3, and B2. It should be 
noted that a rival’s excluding and competing shares are 
analogous to the primary and secondary goods (respectively) 
that characterized our examples of bundled pairs. Hence, 
we apply the ICT by measuring incremental prices and 
costs with respect to this rival’s excluding share. 
Specifically, the bundle’s incremental price is the bundle’s 
price less the market price of rival 1’s excluding share, $14. 
The bundle’s incremental cost is therefore the cost of the 
bundle less the cost of rival 1’s excluding share, $12. Hence, 
the ICT is passed with respect to rival 1. If we consider the 
bundle from the perspective of rival 2, our results change. 
To begin, we note that rival 2’s competing share is 1 unit of 
B2, while its excluding share is 1 unit of each of the goods 
A1, A2, and A3, as well as 2 units of B1. If we use the same 
process to apply the ICT using rival 2’s bundle shares, we 
find an incremental price and cost of $4 and $6 respectively. 
Thus, the ICT is failed with respect to rival 2. 
This example, as well as previous ones,29
  
 29. See supra Part II.A.  
 illustrates a 
number of important implications. First, a bundle’s 
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exclusionary potential30
A bundled discount can injure a rival even if the 
bundling strategy is undeniably pro-competitive. In 
particular, a rival who produces only 1 of the goods within a 
large bundle may be completely excluded regardless of how 
competitive the goods in the bundle are. Suppose a bundle 
includes 1 unit each of 10 different goods, but the rival 
produces only 1 of those 10 goods. Because the rival’s 
excluding share is so much larger than its competing share, 
the rival likely cannot compete with the bundle at any price, 
above cost or not. However, this would be true even if many 
other rivals produced the full range of bundled goods, in 
which case predation would not be a viable strategy. Often, 
exclusion of a single firm rival (or rival who makes only a 
subset of goods in a bundle) results from nothing more than 
price competition among other rivals who make either the 
full range, or at least a larger range, of goods in the 
bundle.
 can differ significantly from one 
rival to the next. This can be seen in the two different 
outcomes that resulted when we applied the ICT to two 
different rivals. This demonstrates that the bundle is 
exclusionary within the market for B2, but not within the 
market for B1. Second, bundled goods produced exclusively 
by the bundling firm are not the only sort that can 
contribute to a bundle’s exclusionary potential. Rather, any 
bundled good not produced by a particular rival contributes 
to the bundle’s potential to harm or exclude that rival, even 
if the good is produced by one or more other rivals. Indeed, 
the excluding share of each rival in our example included a 
good produced by the other rival. Hence, we see that not 
only so-called “monopoly goods” can contribute to a bundle’s 
exclusionary potential. In fact, if a bundle consists of only 
competitively-sold goods and if a rival produces only a small 
subset of those goods, then we have no reason to believe this 
bundle has any less exclusionary potential than one 
dominated by monopoly goods. 
31
The excluding share of a bundle contributes to its 
potential for harm, while the competing share detracts from 
 
  
 30. A bundle’s “potential for harm” is simply the extent to which rivals are 
obliged to cut prices in order to compete with the bundle. This is an ordinal 
notion, as we can only use it to make comparisons among bundles. 
 31. For example, if 10 firms produce goods A, B, C, D, and E, all of which are 
priced close to cost and offer even a modest bundled discount, the firm that 
produces only one of these goods will be unable to compete. 
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it. But we have still not determined what specific 
characteristics of these shares actually yield harmful effects 
or how we can use these characteristics to evaluate the 
competitive effects of bundled discounting. In general, the 
potential of a bundle to harm or exclude a rival increases as 
the undiscounted value of that rival’s excluding share grows 
larger. Conversely, this exclusionary potential decreases as 
the total number of bundled units (as opposed to goods) in 
the rival’s competing share is increased.32
• the number of excluding goods facing the rival 
increases; 
 That is because a 
rival’s competing and excluding shares have opposing 
effects on a bundle’s potential to harm that rival. In fact, a 
rival’s competing share of a bundle is analogous to good B in 
the simple case of bundled pairs, while its excluding share 
is analogous to good A. Additionally, a bundle’s potential to 
harm a particular rival will tend to increase as the value of 
the discount provided by the bundle increases. In general, a 
bundle’s potential to harm or exclude a given rival will 
increase as: 
• the bundled quantities of 1 or more of the rival’s 
excluding goods increase; 
• the prices of 1 or more of the rival’s excluding goods 
increase; 
• the number of competing goods facing the rival 
decreases; 
• the bundled quantities of 1 or more of the rival’s 
competing goods decrease; 
• the profit margins of 1 or more of the rival’s 
competing goods decrease; 
• or the discount provided by the bundle (in terms of 
markdown percentage) increases, ceteris paribus.33
One important implication is that if a dominant firm 
makes a large product line and a rival only a very small one, 
then relatively small bundled discounts can exclude. For 
example, suppose that the dominant firm makes 10 
products that cost $9 each and sell individually for $10 
each, but offers a 2% discount to those who take a full set, 
resulting in a price of $98. The rival makes only product 
 
  
 32. For a proof, see infra app. 2. 
 33. See infra app. 2. 
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number 10, which it can sell to the customer for $9, but 
then the customer will have to pay $90 for the other 9 
products from the dominant firm, for a total of $99. The 
bundle flunks the attribution test and the ICT. Indeed, in 
this particular example any discount above 1% will exclude 
the rival from the trade of those customers who want the 
entire package; but such trivial discounts are almost 
certainly justified by cost savings in contracting or delivery, 
if not in production. 
This brings us back to our earlier observation about the 
definition of an equally efficient firm.34
Finally, our results imply that if the profit margins of a 
rival’s competing goods are relatively small, then the bundle 
is more likely to fail the attribution test with respect to that 
rival. This produces the ironic result that the less monopoly 
power a bundling firm has in the markets for a rival’s 
competing goods, the more likely its bundle will fail the test. 
That is, as the market price of the competing good 
approaches marginal cost, a smaller discount is needed to 
exclude.
 When a multi-
product firm enters the market, any multi-product cost 
savings can justify a multi-product discount. This includes 
transaction and transportation cost savings as well as strict 
production cost savings. Indeed, for a multi-product firm not 
to have any scope economies would be exceptional. All it 
takes is one input or production process whose costs can be 
distributed over multiple goods. In these cases, the discount 
is merely a mechanism by which these cost savings can be 
passed on to consumers. 
35
  
 34. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10. 
 On the other hand, the profit margins of a rival’s 
excluding goods will generally not impact the bundle’s 
potential to exclude that rival. For example, suppose a 
bundle includes 1 unit each of the 3 goods, A, B, and C, and 
a rival produces only the goods B and C. Assume that each 
good has a price of $10, and that the bundle offers a 20% 
discount, yielding a bundled price of $24. First, suppose that 
production costs are $6 for all 3 goods. Then, measured with 
respect to this rival’s excluding share, a single unit of A, the 
bundle’s incremental price and cost are $14 and $12 
respectively. Hence, the attribution test is passed. Now, 
 35. For example, if the dominant firm is an A good monopolist and the B good 
is sold in a perfectly competitive market at a price equal to marginal cost, then 
any discount on an A-B package could exclude the rival. 
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suppose that B and C each cost $9 to produce. In this case, 
the bundle’s incremental price is still $14, but its 
incremental cost is $18, so the attribution test is failed. This 
is because the rival’s competing goods now have much 
smaller profit margins, severely limiting its ability to cut 
prices and compete with the bundle. Moreover, this is true 
regardless of what profit margin is observed by the rival’s 
excluding goods. Indeed, if the cost of producing A were $0, 
or even $10, our results would not change. 
The implications should not be lost—the more 
competitive the markets of a rival’s competing goods are to 
begin with, the easier it will be for a rival to prove exclusion 
under the prevailing antitrust tests. This leads to the 
perverse result that the tests tend to show more positive 
results as monopolization in the competing good markets 
becomes less likely. 
B. Joint Offers by Rivals 
Even if no rival produces the full range of bundled 
goods, predatory bundling may not be a viable strategy. 
Specifically, if 2 or more rivals can collectively produce all or 
most of the goods within a bundle, then exclusion may not 
be possible. For example, suppose a bundle includes 1 unit 
each of the 3 goods X, Y, and Z. Rival 1 produces only good 
X, rival 2 produces only good Y, and rival 3 produces only 
good Z. All goods have individual prices and costs of $10 and 
$6, respectively. Finally, assume the bundle offers a 20% 
discount, which yields a bundled price of $24. For any one of 
the three rivals, the bundle’s incremental price is $4, while 
its incremental cost is $6. Hence, the ICT is failed with 
respect to each rival. However, because the rivals 
collectively produce the contents of the bundle, the 
exclusion of any rival is not generally possible, provided 
each rival has an incentive to compete with the bundle. 
Indeed, each rival could reduce the price of its only 
competing good to $8, which still leaves a $2 markup. This 
effectively eliminates the discount provided by the bundle, 
as its contents can now be bought separately for the same 
price at which the bundle is sold. 
In fact, even if rivals collectively produce only a subset 
of the goods within the bundle, exclusion is unlikely if that 
subset is sufficiently large. We could remove rival one from 
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our previous example,36
Note, however, that if the dominant firm offers a bundle 
subject to joint costs or economies of scope, then rivals will 
not be able to join forces and compete by offering the larger 
bundle unless they can also attain the joint cost savings. If 
A and B can be produced more cheaply together than 
separately, a firm that produces A alone and one that 
produces B alone will not attain the cost savings simply 
because they bundle their separately produced A and B 
together; they would have to engage in actual joint 
production.
 so that the two remaining rivals 
collectively produce only goods Y and Z. In this case, the two 
rivals can price their respective competing goods at $7, 
which still allows them to compete with the bundle at 
above-cost prices. To generalize, exclusion is not likely to 
occur if some combination of rivals can collectively produce 
all or even most of the goods within the bundle—the larger 
the number of the goods in the dominant firm’s bundle they 
can offer, the less likely they will be excluded. 
37
C. Variable Proportion Bundles 
 
In a variable proportion bundle, the discount rate and 
the set of bundled goods are predetermined by the bundling 
firm, but the bundled quantities of those goods are 
subjectively chosen by consumers. The competitive effects of 
variable proportion bundling change as the proportions of 
bundled goods are varied. 
When bundling occurs on a very large scale, it becomes 
more difficult for purchasers to predetermine the contents of 
bundles. Indeed, as the set of bundled goods and their 
respective quantities become more diverse, the bundle 
appeals to a more specific subset of consumers. In such 
cases, the sellers have every incentive to give buyers 
considerable freedom in choosing the bundle’s contents. For 
example, a medical device manufacturer may offer a 10% 
discount to hospitals that purchase a minimum specified 
share of their needs of 5 different products from the 
manufacturer; however, the precise amount that they 
  
 36. See supra Part II.B.  
 37. On the significance of joint costs, or cost savings that accrue to production 
or distribution of the bundle, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1 at 
525-28. 
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purchase during the contract period will depend on patient 
demand, and the proportions sold under the same contract 
could vary from one purchaser to another. Indeed, it would 
almost certainly be impossible to negotiate a single contract 
with a large number of purchasers if all purchasers were 
required to take the goods in the bundle in the same 
proportion.38
To see how varying the proportions of bundled goods 
impact a bundle’s competitive effects, reconsider our 
example from the first section.
 
39
However, suppose that the bundle contains 1 unit of A 
and 3 units of B. As before, the bundle offers a 20% 
discount, so that its price is $32. To apply the attribution 
test we attribute the entire $8 discount to the 3 units of B, 
which results in $22. This is the maximum price that the 
rival, who makes only the B, can charge for the 3 units. 
Since B costs $7 to produce, the rival can sell the 3 units 
and have $1 left over; the bundle passes the AMC’s 
attribution test. Alternatively, to apply the ICT, we compare 
the bundle’s incremental cost (over the single unit of A)
 Once again, assume that a 
primary good A costs $5 to produce, while a secondary good 
B costs $7 to produce. Both goods sell for individual prices of 
$10. The monopolist offers a 20% discount on a bundle that 
includes 1 unit of both A and B, yielding a bundled price of 
$16. A rival sells only B. As before, this bundle flunks both 
the attribution test and the ICT. In order for a rival who 
makes only B to compete, it would have to charge $6 for B, 
which is $1 less than its costs.  
40
  
 38. In general, a bundle tends to exclude rivals less as it contains more of the 
competitive product in relation to the monopoly product. See infra app. 2. 
 to 
its incremental price. Because we assume there are no joint 
cost savings, the incremental cost is simply 3 times the cost 
of B, or $21, while the incremental price is the price of the 
bundle less the price of A, or $22. Hence, the incremental 
price of the bundle exceeds its incremental cost, and so the 
bundle with the 1 to 3 ratio of A to B warrants safe harbor. 
A pass of the attribution test always guarantees a pass of 
the ICT, whether or not any cost savings result from jointly 
 39. See supra Part I.  
 40. In general, we use the set of all bundled goods not produced by rivals as 
the basis for measuring its incremental prices and costs (i.e., if this bundle 
contained X units of A, then we would use X times the price of A as this basis).  
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producing the contents of the bundle.41
This fact has a number of implications. First, as a 
matter of analysis, one can never apply the attribution test 
or ICT over products in a 1 to 1 ratio if the customers in fact 
were offered or actually purchased a different ratio. Second, 
if the goods in the bundle are partial substitutes, a 
customer can avoid the bundle by purchasing relatively 
more of the competitive good. Third, the foreclosure story 
can become much more complex in circumstances where 
different customers take significantly different proportions 
of bundled goods. As a matter of antitrust, exclusion is 
measured by calculating the portion of the relevant market 
from which a rival is excluded. In effect, one asks what 
portion of the aggregate sales of a rival’s competing good(s) 
consisted of bundles with which that rival could not 
compete. But when bundles are sold in varied proportions, 
simply aggregating the sales does not work. Consider a 
simple example of variable proportion bundling where 
aggregate sales would indicate a larger degree of harm than 
actually occurred.  
 In sum, changing the 
proportions of goods in the bundle will affect its 
exclusionary potential. For that reason, as the proportion of 
a rival’s competing goods in the bundle increases, the 
bundle becomes less likely to fail either the AMC’s 
attribution test or the ICT.  
Suppose a dominant firm engages in variable proportion 
bundling of the two goods A and B. As in previous 
illustrations, both A and B have individual prices of $10, 
while production costs are $5 for A and $7 for B. A rival 
produces only B. The bundling firm offers a 20% on bundled 
sales, regardless of what quantities appear in a consumer’s 
bundle. For simplicity, we will assume there are only two 
types of buyers in this setting. Type 1 consumers want 
bundles with 4 units of A and 1 unit of B. Type 2 consumers 
want bundles with 1 unit of A and 4 units of B. We will refer 
to these two bundles as bundle 1 and bundle 2 respectively, 
—both of which have a bundled price of $40.  
Bundle 1, which has 4 units of A and 1 unit of B, is 
exclusionary. The rival’s excluding share of bundle 1 
consists of 4 units of A, so the incremental price and cost of 
  
 41. See infra app. 3.  
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bundle 1 are $0 and $7 respectively. In any instance where 
the incremental price of a bundle is non-positive, the rival 
will not be able to compete with it, provided production 
costs are above zero. Conversely, bundle 2 earns safe harbor 
with relative ease. In this case, the rival’s excluding share is 
a single unit of A, so bundle 2 has an incremental price and 
cost of $30 and $28 respectively. Hence, the rival is excluded 
from competing for type 1 consumers, but not type 2 
consumers. 
The fact that all the bundles being purchased are not 
exclusionary is significant when considering the aggregate 
sales that take place in this market. Suppose that after 
serving all consumers of both types, the bundling firm has 
aggregate sales consisting of 100 units of A and 100 units of 
B. If we apply the attribution test to the aggregate sales 
made by the bundling firm, the attribution test is failed. 
Specifically, we could treat these sales as one large bundle, 
which would have a net price of $1600. Hence, this bundle 
would provide a nominal discount of $400 which, when 
attributed to the 100 units of B, would require that each 
unit of B be sold for a price of $6 if the rival is to compete. 
This is below the cost of producing B, so the aggregate sales 
of the bundling firm would indeed be exclusionary if they 
were in fact sold in the same proportions. However, we 
know that this is not actually the case. Rather, bundles 
were sold in two different proportions, only one of which 
was exclusionary. 
For example, suppose the bundling firm’s aggregate 
sales were comprised of 20 sales of both bundles 1 and 2. Or, 
to say this differently, the bundling firm served 20 
consumers of each type. This would result in aggregate 
sales of 100 units of A and 100 units of B, as hypothesized 
earlier. However, of the 100 units of B sold by the bundling 
firm, only 20 were sold as a part of bundle 1—the only 
exclusionary bundle sold in the market. Hence, the rival 
was excluded from only 20% of these sales, as it could have 
set prices that would have permitted it to compete with 
bundle 2. By examining market shares, we can determine 
from what portion of the overall market for B the rival was 
foreclosed. For example, if bundled sales of B constitute 50% 
of the overall market for B, and if the rival is foreclosed 
from only 20% of those sales, then the rival is foreclosed 
from only 10% of the overall market for B. So, while 
examining only the aggregate result of bundled sales would 
suggest the rival has been foreclosed from all bundled sales 
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and hence 50% of the overall market it has in fact been 
foreclosed from a much smaller portion of that market. 
This result is particularly important when assessing, for 
example, class action suits in which the plaintiffs are rival 
producers of bundled goods. Clearly, aggregate sales are not 
a reflection of the market-wide exclusion that actually took 
place. We can assess the exclusionary impact of the 
bundling strategy only by examining the specific contents of 
the various bundles. This also implies that even if 1 rival 
has a legitimate claim of unreasonable exclusion, a different 
rival may not. If the bundles being sold contained more than 
2 goods, then different rivals would be affected differently 
depending on what bundled goods they can produce. For 
example, suppose that all bundles sold in the preceding 
example also included 1 unit of C, which has a price and 
cost of $10 and $6 respectively. Hence, both bundles would 
have a price of $48, and both would fail the attribution test 
with respect to a rival that produces only C. In that case, 
the rival is foreclosed from all bundled sales of good C. If we 
assume that bundled sales constitute 50% of the total sales 
of C, then this rival would be foreclosed from 50% of the 
overall market for C. In this way, we see that it is not 
generally possible to infer a bundle’s potential to exclude 1 
rival by examining its effect on a different rival. Likewise, 
we cannot examine aggregate sales to determine the 
exclusionary force of a variable proportion bundling 
strategy. 
In sum, the exclusionary power of the bundle 
diminishes, perhaps dramatically, as individual customers 
are able to make different substitution decisions. This is 
particularly significant if the goods in the bundle are partial 
substitutes. If A is a monopolized good and B is a 
competitive good, a customer will have an incentive to use 
relatively more of B and relatively less of A and can avoid 
purchasing the dominant firm’s bundle simply by changing 
its proportions in favor of B. For example, hospital group 
purchasing contracts for medical devices, such as 
hypodermic needles or catheters, may include within the 
bundle goods that are differentiated, but nevertheless have 
many common uses. The purchaser may be able to avoid the 
monopolist for purchase of the competitive good simply by 
purchasing more of that good in relation to the monopolized 
good. As the A and B good are closer substitutes for each 
other, customers will find it easier to take relatively more of 
B and relatively less of A.  
1252 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57  
In contrast to substitutability, complementarity among 
the goods in the bundle has a different effect. For example, 
if a monopolist offers a bundle that cannot be matched by 
rivals and yet there remains a large number of consumers 
who only want one of the goods, then significant harm is 
unlikely to occur. Conversely, if A and B are uniformly 
consumed together, then a bundle containing a relatively 
large amount of the A good may prove fatal for competitors. 
The greater the extent to which the goods in a bundle are 
complements, meaning that the consumer uses all of them 
together, the greater the exclusionary power of the bundled 
discount. 
However, complementarity must be perceived by a large 
portion of consumers if harm is to occur. Trivially, a bundle 
threatens rival producers of a bundled good only insofar as 
the rival’s customers desire the remaining contents of the 
bundle. Many instances of bundled discounts might be pro-
competitive, despite the fact that they fail the ICT, for the 
simple reason that plenty of customers exist who do not 
want all of the goods in the bundle. In fact, when a bundle is 
sufficiently specialized to prevent losing unbundled sales, 
the bundling strategy can be profitable no matter how small 
its profit margin is. That is, if a bundle appeals to a much 
different group of consumers than does its primary product 
alone, then a failure of the attribution test is not suspicious 
in the least. Indeed, if the bundling firm can ensure that 
customers who buy only the primary good will not revert to 
the less-profitable bundle, then the bundling strategy will 
increase total profits no matter how slight the bundle’s 
margin is. In these cases, the bundle serves as little more 
than an independent compromise between a reduced profit 
margin and additional sales.  
D. Price Discrimination 
Bundled pricing can often be used to facilitate price 
discrimination, which occurs when a seller obtains different 
returns on different groupings of sale.42
  
 42. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 528-29; see also AMC 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 398-99; DENNIS W. CARLTON & MICHAEL WALDMAN, 
SAFE HARBORS FOR QUANTITY DISCOUNTS AND BUNDLING (2008), at EAG 08-1, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/230712.htm.  For a more 
technical treatment of price discrimination strategies, see DENNIS W. CARLTON & 
JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION  324-30 (4th ed. 2005). 
 Price discrimination 
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of one type can occur when producers predetermine the 
ratio of goods in a bundle. Such bundling is generally used 
to attract consumers who place relatively less value on a 
particular bundled good or who require a relatively 
uncommon combination of related goods. Specifically, the 
bundling firm charges these consumers different prices by 
bundling different combinations of goods that appeal to 
their respective demands. This also protects the bundling 
firm from arbitrage, as these bundles typically include 
particular goods or quantities that appeal only to the 
consumers for whom they were intended. For example, 
suppose a firm produces an electric drill that strongly 
appeals to “light users,” who need it only for sporadic 
household repairs. However, the drill attracts only a small 
number of “heavy users,” who require near daily use of 
electric drills. In order to better reach these consumers, the 
drill producer might decide to offer a discounted bundle 
whose contents appeal to heavy users. For example, the 
bundle might include a large number of industrial drill bits, 
which are typically sold in a competitive market. It would 
offer a large discount on the bundle, as heavy users place 
less value on the drill itself. As a result, the bundle would 
likely be less profitable than the drill sold individually. But, 
in exchange, the drill producer acquires many customers 
who would otherwise buy a different drill. More 
importantly, it does not lose standalone sales of the drill, 
because the bundle includes far more of the heavier bits 
than are required by light users. Hence, total profits could 
easily increase, even if the bundle’s incremental cost 
exceeds its incremental price. In this way, the bundle is 
used to reach a specific group of consumers who place 
relatively less value on the drill itself and who can be 
uniquely targeted with a highly specific bundle. What is 
more, the drill producer accomplishes this without having to 
cut the drill’s standalone price.43
  
 43. For example, suppose light users value the drill at $22 and heavy users at 
$18 because they prefer a more heavy duty alternative. The drill has a 
standalone price of $20, which includes a $5 markup. A package of heavy duty 
bits has a price of $10, which includes a $1 markup. With little use for the heavy 
drill bits, light users value this package at only $4 and would not purchase it in 
a competitive market. But heavy users, who require the bits every day, value 
the package at $12. The firm bundles the drill and the bits at a price of $28, 
which is valued at $30 by heavy users, but only $26 by light users. Hence, heavy 
users buy the bundle and light users buy the drill individually. Moreover, the 
manufacturer earns good profits either way. 
 When price discrimination 
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works in this fashion, it increases the manufacturer’s sales 
in some portion of the market. Further, since the sales are 
profitable, the strategy does not require the exclusion of any 
rival. As with all output increasing practices, however, 
exclusion of a rival might result. 
As is well known, price discrimination can also be 
facilitated by variable proportion ties,44
But variable proportion bundled discounts may not 
work as effectively as variable proportion ties. As the 
preceding discussion suggests, as the ratio of competitive 
units (the cartridges) to monopolized units (the printer) 
increases, it becomes less likely that the bundle will flunk 
the attribution test.
 and bundled 
discounts might serve as a substitute for a tie. For example, 
the owner of a printer monopoly might sell the printer at 
cost, but require the customer to purchase ink cartridges at 
monopoly prices. In that case, the seller’s return on any 
particular customer’s print/cartridge combination will be 
higher as the customer uses more cartridges. 
45
CONCLUSION 
 As a result, competition would be 
relatively easier for rival ink producers. This implies that 
high-volume customers will very likely be able to forego the 
discount on the printer and then purchase their cartridges 
at a lower price in a competitive market. So, the strategy 
loses the very customers from whom the higher rate of 
return would be expected. 
Bundling practices are extremely diverse and their 
impact must be evaluated individually. The type of multi-
product bundling most likely to cause harm is that which 
was at issue in LePage’s, where the defendant offered 
evidently custom-made bundles to different large customers 
in order to get them to drop the plaintiff’s line of cellophane 
tape.46
  
 44. See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1711 
(2d ed. 2004); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.6e (3d ed. 2005). 
 The kind that is least likely to cause harm occurs 
when the seller has a single contract calling for discounts 
 45. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
 46. LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (describing 
individually targeted discount schemes linked to customers’ cessation of 
purchases of plaintiff’s tape). 
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aggregated across a large number of products and sold to 
numerous customers. Harm is less likely as customers are 
able to vary the proportion of goods in the bundle or 
substitute one good for another, or as rivals produce the 
same good(s) that the allegedly excluded firm produces, 
even if the rivals do not produce a full line. When nearly all 
consumers want a diverse bundle of some variety of goods, 
but the desired contents of those bundles differ among 
buyers, bundling plays a larger role than simply to serve the 
rarified interests of a few. Specifically, it works both to pass 
on to consumers the cost savings observed by large-scale 
buyers or producers and to reduce transaction costs. Much 
of these savings can then be passed down to customers, who 
also avoid the many transactions that would be necessary 
without multi-product purchasing contracts. 
True anticompetitive exclusion by means of bundled 
discounts is undoubtedly a rarity. Most of all, our analysis 
shows that the Antitrust Commission’s “attribution” test, 
which we have modified as an incremental cost test, is a 
useful safe harbor for recognizing bundled discounts that 
cannot exclude an equally efficient rival. However, the test 
produces very severe false positives and should be regarded 
as nothing more than a starting point for analysis. As the 
number of goods in a bundle increases and as undiscounted 
prices move closer to cost, the extent of false positives 
increases as well. 
APPENDICES 
The arguments made in the appendices rely on the 
general methods and notations introduced in Appendix 1. 
We attempt to model the practice of bundled discounting in 
the most general possible context. We will then be able to 
draw several important conclusions regarding this practice 
and also evaluate the cost-based tests currently used to 
assess its competitive effects.  
The analysis presented below is not intended to 
evaluate the competing strategies employed by bundling 
firms and their rivals. The objects of this analysis are not 
the firms or agents that engage in bundled discounting, but 
rather the bundles themselves. We seek to provide a means 
of assessing a given bundle’s potential for harm which, upon 
comparison to the strategy’s overall profitability will allow 
for more educated assessments of a bundle’s propriety. 
Indeed, to merit antitrust intervention, the courts require 
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not only that a bundle excludes, but that it is in fact 
“unreasonably exclusionary,” or designed with only that 
purpose in mind.  
Appendix 1: The Model 
To begin, we will characterize the competitive 
environment hypothesized by the model. Let X = {𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,…, 
𝑥𝑥N} denote a discrete set of N different goods. We will 
consider bundles over this set, though a bundle need not 
include every good therein. Rather, we assume only that 
every bundle contains at least two elements of X in positive 
quantities.  
We will rely on a cost vector of the form C = (C1, C2,…, 
CN) ∊ (0, ∞)N, which is observed by all firms. Explicitly, for 
all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N, C𝑖𝑖 gives the marginal cost of producing 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. 
Likewise, X admits a price vector P ∊ (0, ∞)N, which is of the 
form P = (P1, P2,…, PN). These define standalone prices, so 
that, for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N, P𝑖𝑖 gives the price of an individual 
unit of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. We will assume that no goods in X are priced 
below cost, so that P ≥ C. Also, we will assume that no 
bundle is priced below the aggregate cost of its contents, as 
this would effectively constitute an instance of predatory 
pricing, which is not within the scope of this paper. 
We will characterize bundles as vectors of the form γ = 
Qγ⨉{βγ} ∊ [0, ∞) N × (0, 1), where Qγ = (q1(γ), q2(γ),…, qN(γ)) 
defines the bundled quantities of each good in X, and βγ 
denotes the discount factor employed by γ. Each bundle has 
a component that defines its own discount factor because 
variations in these factors can lead to further variations in 
the competitive effects of those bundles. As such, it is best to 
consider two bundles with identical contents and different 
discount factors as two distinct possibilities. With this, we 
can define a correspondence whose values define the sets of 
all possible discounted bundles, given prices and costs. 
 
Definition 1.1: Let X, C, and P be as defined above. Then 
the following correspondence defines the sets of all possible 
discounted bundles over X:  
Γ(X, C, P) = { γ = Qγ⨉{βγ} ∊ [0, ∞)N × (0, 1) | Qγ∙C ≤ Qγ∙βγP ;  
 
∃𝑖𝑖,∊ {1,2,…,N}, 𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗, with q𝑖𝑖(γ), 
q𝑗𝑗(γ) > 0} 
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Where q(γ) denotes the 𝑖𝑖th component of Qγ, which gives the 
bundled quantity of the good 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N. It should 
be noted that a bundle’s price is given by Qγ∙βγP. With these 
things in mind, we can go on to present several definitions 
that will be important in later sections.  
 
Definition 1.2: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P). We let S(γ) ⊆ X denote 
the support of γ, or the set of all goods in X with positive 
bundled quantities. Explicitly, S(γ) = ⋃ { 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ X | q𝑖𝑖(γ) >N𝑖𝑖=1
0 }. 
 
Definition 1.3: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a firm that 
sells only individual units of goods in X. We will let Y(R) ⊆ 
X denote the set of goods in X that R produces. Then we say 
R is a rival of the bundling firm if and only if Y(R)⋂S(γ) ≠ ∅, 
and we characterize R’s position relative to γ with the 
following definitions: 
I. GC(γ; R) = Y(R)⋂S(γ) ∊ X defines the set of competing 
goods observed by R. 
II. GE(γ; R) = S(γ)∖Y(R) ∊ X defines the set of excluding 
goods observed by R. 
III. QC(γ; R) = (φ1(γ; R)q1(γ), φ2(γ; R)q2(γ),…, φN(γ; 
R)qN(γ)) ∊ [0, ∞)N defines the competing share of γ 
observed by R. 
IV. QE(γ; R) = ([1 –φ1(γ; R)]q1(γ), [1 –φ2(γ; R)]q2(γ),…, [1 –
φN(γ; R)]qN(γ)) ∊ [0, ∞)N defines the excluding share of 
γ observed by R. 
 
              Where  φi(γ;  R) = �
1  if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GC(γ;  R)
  0   otherwise           
    ∀ 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , N.    
 
Two obvious implications of these definition are that 
GC(γ; R) + GE(γ; R) = S(γ) and QC(γ; R) + QE(γ; R) = Qγ, for 
any rival R. 
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Appendix 2: Competitive Effects 
In the text, we often referred to a rival’s ability to 
compete with a bundle. We said that in order to compete 
with a bundle, a rival must price his competing goods so 
that consumers can buy the contents of the bundle 
separately for a net price no greater than the price of the 
bundle. Before offering an explicit condition for this, 
however, we will define the set of pricing strategies that 
allow a rival to compete with a bundle. Specifically, we will 
define the set of price cuts that (i) allow the rival to compete 
with the bundle, and (ii) result in sustainable prices for all 
competing goods observed by the rival. This will then allow 
us to define a condition for competing with a bundle, which 
will be given in terms of these price cuts. 
 
Definition 2.1: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. Then 
the following correspondence defines the set of all possible 
combinations of price cuts K = (𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2,…, 𝑘𝑘N) that can be 
implemented by R in order to compete with γ, and which 
leave all competing goods priced no lower than cost: 
PC(γ; R) = { K ∊ [0, ∞)N | 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ≤ P𝑖𝑖 − C𝑖𝑖 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GC(γ; R), 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N ; 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 0 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∉ GC(γ; R), 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N ; 
QC(γ; R)∙K ≥ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P } 
 
Where 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 denotes the 𝑖𝑖th component K, for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2,…,N.  
The third condition stipulated by the price cut 
correspondence ensures that the price cuts allow the rival to 
compete with the bundle. To see how the condition was 
formulated, we consider an equivalent inequality: 
QC(γ; R)∙(P − K) + QE(γ; R)∙(P − K) ≤ Qγ∙βγP. 
This says that, after the price cuts have been imposed, 
consumers can afford to buy separately the competing and 
excluding shares of the bundle for a net price no greater 
than the bundle’s price. It should be noted that the price of 
the bundle is still defined as Qγ∙βγP and not Qγ∙βγ(P − K), 
because the price cuts apply to sales made by the rival and 
not those of the bundling firm. This is the same premise 
that underscores the cost-based tests used for granting safe 
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harbor; it is the same definition of rival-bundle competition 
that was provided in the text. Of course, the price cuts only 
correspond to competing goods, so that we can simply the 
condition as follows:  
QC(γ; R)∙(P − K) + QE(γ; R)∙P ≤ Qγ∙βγP. 
⟹ QC(γ; R)∙K ≥ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P. 
As definition 2.1 indicates, the above inequality is a 
necessary condition for any price cut combination that 
permits R to compete with γ. The two remaining conditions 
stipulate that (i) price cuts are attributed only to a rival’s 
competing goods; and (ii) no competing goods are priced 
below cost after the price cuts are imposed. An obvious 
corollary of this definition is that a rival can compete with a 
bundle without pricing any competing goods below cost if 
and only if PC(γ; R) ≠ Ø. 
By defining the set of price cuts sufficient for a rival to 
compete with a bundle, we can identify how different 
aspects of bundles contribute to their potential for harm. To 
do this, we first note that a bundle can exclude a rival only 
if that rival must resort to setting unsustainable in order to 
compete with a bundle. To that end, we can characterize a 
bundle’s potential for harming a rival by examining the 
magnitude of the price cuts that allow said rival to compete. 
This will allow us to determine what aspects of a bundle 
contribute to its potential for harm. 
Our first result will identify how various characteristics 
of a bundle’s excluding share contribute to its potential for 
harm. As the following proposition illustrates, this potential 
is influenced by both the number and quantities of 
excluding goods, as well as the bundle’s discount factor.  
Proposition 2.2:
(I) βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ1; R) = GE(γ2; R); QE(γ1; R) ≥ QE(γ2; R); and 
q𝑚𝑚(γ1) > q𝑚𝑚(γ2) for some excluding good 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 ∊ GE(γ1; R) = 
GE(γ2; R), 𝑚𝑚 ∊ {1,2,…,N}. 
 Fix γ1, γ2 ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival 
such that QC(γ1; R) = QC(γ2; R). Then ∀ K ∊ PC(γ1; R), ∃α ∊ 
(0, 1) such that αK ∊ PC(γ2; R) if any of the following 
conditions are observed: 
(II) QE(γ1; R) = QE(γ2; R) and βγ1 < βγ2. 
(III) βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ2; R) ⊊ GE(γ1; R); and q𝑖𝑖(γ1) = q𝑖𝑖(γ1) for all 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GE(γ2; R), 𝑖𝑖=1,2,…N. 
 
Proof: Assume PC(γ1; R) ≠ Ø, and fix K ∊ PC(γ1; R). 
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(Part I) Assume that βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ1; R) = GE(γ2; R); 
QE(γ1; R) ≥ Q E(γ2; R); and q𝑚𝑚(γ1) > q𝑚𝑚(γ2) for some 
excluding good 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 ∊ GE(γ1; R) = GE(γ2; R), 𝑚𝑚 ∊ {1,2,…,N}. 
⟹ QC(γ1; R)∙K ≥ Qγ1∙(1 − βγ1)P 
⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙K ≥ Qγ1∙(1 − βγ2)P > Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P. 
Set α = [Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P]/[Qγ1∙(1 − βγ2)P] ∊ (0, 1). 
⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙αK ≥ Qγ1∙α(1 − βγ2)P = Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P. 
Moreover, K ∊ PC(γ1; R) implies that, ∀𝑖𝑖=1,2,…N: (i) α𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 
= 0 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is not a competing good; and (ii) P𝑖𝑖 − α𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ≥ C𝑖𝑖 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
is a competing good. 
⟹ αK ∊ PC(γ2; R). 
(Part II) Assume that QE(γ1; R) = QE(γ2; R) and βγ1 < βγ2. 
Set α = (1 − βγ2)/(1 − βγ1) ∊ (0, 1). 
K ∊ PC(γ1; R) and QC(γ1; R) = QC(γ2; R) ⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙αK 
≥ Qγ1∙α(1 − βγ1)P, which likewise implies QC(γ2; R)∙αK ≥ 
Qγ2∙α(1 − βγ1)P = Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P. 
⟹ αK ∊ PC(γ2; R), by the same argument used in Part I. 
(Part III) Assume that βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ2; R) ⊊ GE(γ1; R); 
and q𝑖𝑖(γ1) = q𝑖𝑖(γ2), for all excluding goods 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GE(γ2; R), 
𝑖𝑖=1,2,…N. 
⟹ QC(γ1; R)∙K = QC(γ2; R)∙K ≥ Qγ1∙(1 − βγ1)P = Qγ1∙(1 − 
βγ2)P > Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P. 
Set α = [Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P]/[Qγ1∙(1 − βγ2)P] ∊ (0, 1). 
⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙αK ≥ Qγ1∙α(1 − βγ2)P = Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P. 
⟹ αK ∊ PC(γ2; R), by the same argument used in Part I. 
□. 
This proof outlines conditions sufficient for reducing the 
magnitude of any price cut combination that allows a rival 
to compete with a bundle. It relies on the premise that if a 
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rival can compete with one bundle using price cuts that are 
strictly smaller than those required by a second bundle, 
then the latter is more harmful than the former. In this 
way, the preceding proof demonstrates that a bundle’s 
potential for harm decreases as (i) the bundled quantities of 
one or more excluding goods decrease; (ii) its discount factor 
increases; or (iii) the number of excluding goods decreases, 
ceteris paribus. 
We can also say something about how the prices and 
quantities of competing goods affect a bundle’s potential for 
harm. As indicated in the text, in order to compete with a 
bundle, a rival must make relatively larger price cuts as the 
ratio of the excluding share’s value to the number of 
competing units is increased. 
 
Proposition 2.3:
 
 Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and le t R be a rival. 
Then, holding constant the ratio of the competing share’s 
retail value to the number of competing bundled units, the 
average price cut per bundled unit (of competing goods) 
required for R to compete with γ is strictly increasing in the 
ratio of the excluding share’s retail value to the number of 
bundled units of competing goods, or [QE(γ; R)∙P]/[ Q C(γ; 
R)∙{1}N]. 
Proof:
QC(γ; R)∙K ≥ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P. 
 Recall that QC(γ; R)∙K gives the sum of all price 
cuts applied by a rival to competing units within the 
bundle. We have previously shown that a rival can 
compete with these price cuts if and only if the following 
condition holds: 
Hence, the right hand side of this inequality defines the 
smallest possible sum of all price cuts that are applied 
to bundled units of competing goods, and which allow 
the rival to compete with the bundle. Hence, on average, 
the price of each bundled unit (of a competing good) 
must fall by the following amount if the rival is to 
compete: 
μ𝑘𝑘 = [ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P]/[ QC(γ; R)∙{1}N] = 1 −  βγ) �
QC (γ ;R)∙P
QC (γ ;R)∙{1}N
+
QE (γ;R)∙P
QC (γ ;R)∙{1}N
� 
 
1262 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57  
Written in this way, the desired result is trivial. μ𝑘𝑘 is 
obviously growing in the ratio of the excluding share’s 
value to the number of competing units (given by the 
second bracketed term), ceteris paribus. 
□. 
Appendix 3: Cost-Based Tests for Safe Harbor 
In previous cases of bundled discounting, the courts 
have occasionally applied a cost-based test known as the 
attribution test. In effect, the test determines whether an 
equally efficient rival can afford to compete with a bundle 
without pricing below cost. We can define this test so that it 
is applicable to the general case of many different bundled 
goods and quantities. However, to do this, it will be useful to 
drop our previous assumption of constant marginal 
production costs. Explicitly, if V ∊ [0, ∞)N is a bundle of 
goods in X, where the 𝑖𝑖th component of V gives the quantity 
of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N, then we will let C(V) denote the cost 
of jointly producing the bundle described by V. We will still 
assume that all rivals are equally efficient producers of 
competing goods, though they may not observe cost savings 
that result from jointly producing competing and excluding 
goods. Also, we will assume that firms minimize production 
costs, so that C(V) denotes the cheapest possible cost of 
producing the contents of V. This will be useful in 
discussing certain cost irregularities (e.g., joint costs or 
economies of scope), which may be observed only by the 
bundling firm as a result of its larger range of outputs.  
Definition 3.1: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. Then 
γ passes the attribution test with respect to rival R if and 
only if the following condition is met: 
Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C[QC(γ; R)]. 
As discussed in the text, this test is effectively a 
mechanism for determining whether a bundle is 
exclusionary with respect to a particular rival. Recall that 
we define a bundle to be exclusionary with respect to an 
equally efficient rival if that rival must price one or more 
competing goods below cost in order to compete with the 
bundle. However, as we describe in the text, a bundle’s 
failure of this test is not a strong indicator that the bundle 
is predatory (i.e., that its overall profitability depends on 
the exclusion of one or more rivals). Indeed, the test often 
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yields failing grades to bundles that clearly merit safe 
harbor. To correct this, we introduced an alternative test in 
a previous paper that takes into account any efficiency 
gains that may explain a firm’s decision to offer discounted 
bundles. We call this test the incremental cost test, which 
we will now define for the general case of many bundled 
goods and quantities. 
Definition 3.2: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. Then 
γ passes the incremental cost test with respect to the rival R 
if and only if the following condition is met: 
Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)].  
The left hand side of this inequality measures the 
incremental price of the bundle, measured with respect to 
the excluding share observed by the rival R. Likewise, the 
right hand side describes the bundle’s incremental cost. 
Given our assumption that firms minimize production costs, 
and given an equally efficient rival, we can show that a pass 
of the attribution test implies a pass of the incremental cost. 
However, the converse can be false under certain cost 
conditions. 
Proposition 3.3: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. If γ 
passes the attribution test with respect to R, then it also 
passes the incremental cost test with respect to R. 
Proof:
⟹ Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C[QC(γ; R)]. 
 Assume that γ passes the attribution test with 
respect to R. 
Suppose C[QC(γ; R)] < C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)]. 
⟹ C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)] < C(Qγ), where QC(γ; R) + 
QE(γ; R) = Qγ by definition. 
This contradicts our assumption that firms minimize 
production costs. That is, we define C(Qγ) to be the 
lowest cost at which the contents of Qγ can be produced, 
which cannot be the case if C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)] < 
C(Qγ). 
⟹ C[QC(γ; R)] ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)].  
⟹ Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)].  
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⟹ γ passes the incremental cost test with respect to R. 
□. 
Of course, the converse is not necessarily true. In the 
text we give examples in which the bundling firm observes 
cost savings (e.g., joint cost savings, economies of scope) 
that can be passed down to consumers. Given explicitly, this 
condition says that the bundling firm observes a cost 
structure such that C(Qγ) < C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)]. Of 
course, if a bundling firm takes advantage of these 
efficiency gains, and if a large portion of the savings are 
passed on to consumers, then the resulting prices may leave 
rivals unable to compete. However, this is clearly not the 
sort of exclusion that merits antitrust intervention. Indeed, 
such strategies are often beneficial for both consumers and 
the bundling firm, regardless of how rivals are impacted. 
In the case that no savings result from jointly producing 
the contents of a bundle, things become much simpler. In 
fact, the attribution test and the incremental cost test are 
actually equivalent in this case. To demonstrate this, we 
offer the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.4:
 
 Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. If 
no cost savings result from jointly producing the competing 
and excluding shares of a bundle, then the attribution test 
and the incremental cost test are identical with respect to R. 
Proof:
(⟸) Assume that γ passes the incremental cost test 
with respect to R, and that no cost savings result from 
jointly producing the competing and excluding shares of 
the bundle. Explicitly, this says: 
 (⟹) In proposition 3.3, we showed that a pass of 
the attribution test with respect to R implies a pass of 
the incremental cost test with respect to R. This result 
held without regard to cost savings resulting to joint 
production. With this, we must now show that the 
converse is also true, given our assumptions on costs. 
C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)] = C(Qγ). 
⟹ Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)] = C[QC(γ; R)]. 
⟹ γ passes the attribution test with respect to R. 
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⟹ Taken with respect to R, the attribution test and the 
incremental cost test are equivalent when no cost 
savings result from jointly producing the entire contents 
of the bundle. 
□. 
In some cases it may be preferable to determine 
whether a bundle is potentially exclusionary. That is, we 
may want to determine whether a bundle meets the 
necessary requirements for excluding any rival within the 
markets for its component goods. To serve that purpose, we 
offer the following definition, for which we will return to our 
previous assumption of constant marginal costs. 
Definition 3.5: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P). Then γ is potentially 
exclusionary if the following condition is met:  
∃ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ S(γ), 𝑖𝑖 ∊ {1,2,…,N}, such that q𝑖𝑖(γ)[P𝑖𝑖 − C𝑖𝑖] < Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P. 
 
This condition says that the nominal value of the 
discount provided by the bundle is greater than the summed 
profits earned by all bundled units of one of its bundled 
goods. This is equivalent to saying that the bundle would 
fail the attribution test with respect to a rival who produced 
only the good 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖.   
As indicated within the text, the incremental cost test 
relies on the assumption that a bundle whose incremental 
price (with respect to a rival’s excluding share) exceeds its 
incremental cost is not predatory. By examining the 
implications of passing the incremental cost test, we can see 
why this assumption was made. To begin, we can restate 
the condition stipulated by the incremental cost test, so that 
we can see its implications regarding the bundle’s 
profitability. By moving around the terms that comprise the 
condition stipulated by the incremental cost test, we derive 
following, equivalent condition: 
Qγ∙βγP − C(Qγ) ≥ QE(γ; R)∙P − C[QE(γ; R)] 
This says that the profits earned by the bundle are at 
least as great as those earned by the excluding share alone. 
If this is true, the likelihood that a bundle could be 
predatory and yet still pass the incremental cost is very low. 
Significantly, this could occur only if the bundling firm 
observes significant savings from the joint production of the 
bundle’s various elements. After all, if that were not the 
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case, then the attribution test and incremental cost would 
be equivalent, so that a pass of the incremental cost test 
implies that the bundle is not exclusionary with respect to 
the rival. That would imply that a rival could not be 
excluded, which eliminates the strategy as a candidate for 
predatory bundling. Of course, in the case that the bundling 
firm does observe cost savings due to joint production, it is 
difficult to see how such a bundle might be anticompetitive. 
Indeed, in this case the bundling firm is effectively passing 
its efficiency gains on to consumers in the form of a 
discount. Moreover, the notion of ‘equal efficiency’ becomes 
skewed or even inapplicable in these cases, as described 
within the text. When a rival is left in an untenable position 
due to the innovations or efficiency gains of a competitor, it 
will often be the case that those firms were equally efficient 
before said innovation took place. But these efficiency gains 
must surely be incentivized, particularly if they result in 
discounted prices. And if the profitability of the innovated 
product is no less or even greater than that of the preceding 
one–even after the discount–then this tactic has all the 
defining characteristics of a pro-competitive practice. 
Finally, note that even a bundle that permits rivals to 
compete at above-marginal-cost prices could serve as a 
mechanism for exclusion. All that is necessary is that the 
rival’s sales volume is reduced to such an extent that it 
cannot cover its fixed costs, which can occur anytime the 
demand for a good decreases. For these reasons, it seems 
that the incremental cost test is largely successful in its 
purpose, which is merely to distinguish those instances of 
bundled discounting that are almost certainly not 
predatory. 
 
